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Medical Malpractice: An Overview of the
English Position*
John Hodgson**
INTRODUCTION
The very phrase "medical malpractice" sounds odd to an Eng-
lish lawyer. We tend to refer to medical negligence, although it
is not quite the same thing. Issues arising between doctor and
patient are seen essentially as being matters related to the doc-
tor's duty of care to the patient.' The emphasis on duty of care
means that we are concerned primarily with the tort of negli-
gence, rather than the tort of trespass to the person. There is
one significant exception, in the field of capacity to consent and
the reality of consent. Most medicine in the United Kingdom is
practised within the National Health Service. This is a publicly
provided and funded service, and the patient has no contractual
relationship with the health care provider. The duty of care is
thus a noncontractual one.2 However, where medicine is prac-
tised privately, and therefore in pursuance of a contract, the
same duty of care arises. In other words, the different legal
framework does not affect the standard required. Some judges
regard the expression "negligence" as ill-chosen:
The plaintiff's action sounds in negligence. This is an unfortu-
nate name for the cause of action in this case because her com-
plaint is not that the surgeons did something careless, such as
leaving a swab in at an operation site, but rather that their
* This article is based upon Professor Hodgson's speech delivered at the Fourth
Annual Comparative Health Law Conference, "Medical Malpractice: A Comparative
Analysis," sponsored by Loyola University Chicago School of Law Institute for
Health Law in October of 1993.
** John Hodgson received his Master of Laws from Cambridge University. He
served as a solicitor and is now a Principal Lecturer at The Nottingham-Trent Law
School, The Nottingham-Trent University in Nottingham, U.K.
1. There is an increasing recognition of the fact that health care professionals
other than doctors are involved in patient care. If I use the traditional terminology,
this is for concision, and not in order to deny the importance of the nonmedical
aspects.
2. In the case of hospital medicine, the liability is now borne by the health care
provider under a system of Crown indemnity. General practitioners retain personal
liability.
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considered decision showed a want of proper professional skill
and care.3
It is with this type of case that we are primarily concerned.
There are regrettably many cases of carelessness, but these tend
to be of legal interest only where it is alleged that the careless-
ness goes beyond a matter of mere compensation and is alleg-
edly criminal.
I. DuT, OF CARE
A. General Issues
The basis of Anglo-Scottish negligence law is the 1932 case of
Donoghue v. Stevenson. Until this case the orthodox view was
that there were a number of relationships that created specific
duty situations, including that of doctor and patient, employer
and employee, road users and occupiers of property and their
visitors, but excluded manufacturers of goods and their ultimate
consumers. In Donoghue, a bare majority of the House of
Lords overruled previous decisions and recognised a duty be-
tween manufacturer and consumer. Lord Atkin went further
and, in what has become a classic statement of the law, proposed
that the recognised duty situations should be regarded not as
independent, but as examples of a principle that underlies and
articulates the whole of negligence. This has become known as
the "neighbour principle," from the metaphorical allusion to the
Biblical commandment to "love thy neighbour":
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law,
you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question,
Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must
take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour.
Who then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be -
persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that
I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so
affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions
which are called in question. 5
This general principle was restressed by Lord Reid in the
House of Lords in Home Office v. Dorset Yacht Co. Ltd.6 with
the emphasis laid on the words "reasonably foresee" rather than
3. Clark v. MacLennan, [19831 1 All E.R. 416, 422 (Q.B.) (Peter Pain, J.).
4. 1932 App. Cas. 562 (Appeal taken from Scotland).
5. Id. at 580.
6. 1970 App. Cas. 1004 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
[Vol. 3
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"closely and directly affected." The subsequent history of the
principle has been one of rival interpretations. One of these,
which achieved ascendancy in the seventies and early eighties,
followed Lord Reid in emphasising that aspect of Lord Atkin's
principle that stressed foreseeability, but also recognised that
there might be valid reasons for denying a remedy to a foresee-
able plaintiff on grounds of policy. This formulation is generally
regarded as best expressed in the words of Lord Wilberforce in
Anns v. Merton London Borough Council.7
The question has to be approached in two stages. First one has
to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the per-
son who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship
of proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable
contemplation of the former, carelessness on his part may be
likely to cause damage to the latter, in which case a prima facie
duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first question is answered
affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether there are any
considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit
the scope of the duty.'
The alternative approach, which gained ascendancy in the sec-
ond half of the eighties and with which Lord Keith is promi-
nently associated, returns to Lord Atkin's original formulation
and stresses the need for a close and direct relationship between
the parties, which permits a finding that it is just and reasonable
for a duty of care to be owed in law.9 As the influence of the
"Keith approach" has grown, novel claims have tended to fail.
There have recently been suggestions that even this approach
is under threat from judges who wish to return to the pre-Dono-
ghue v. Stevenson position of separate duty situations, but there
is as yet no suggestion that any of the existing recognised cate-
gories of duty are under threat. 10 Any such approach would of
course make the task of a plaintiff in a novel situation substan-
tially more difficult; rather than fitting his case into an existing
7. 1978 App. Cas. 728 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
8. Id. at 751-52.
9. See, e.g., Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v. Sir Lindsay Parkinson &
Co., 1985 App. Cas. 210, 239-41 (Appeal taken from C.A.) (Keith, L.J., recognizing a
duty as between a local authority with responsibilities for building control and occupi-
ers of flats in that area).
10. Caparo Indus. v. Dickman, [1990] 2 App. Cas. 605, 616-27 (Appeal taken from
C.A.) (Bridge, L.J., approving dicta of Brennan, J., in Sutherland Shire Council v.
Heyman, 60 A.L.R. 1 (1985) (Austl.)). The majority approach is to retain the neigh-
bour principle, coupled with a positive requirement that it be "just and equitable" to
impose liability.
1994]
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set of principles, he will have to justify the creation of a new
category to accommodate him.
One potential new area of liability is a direct liability of the
health care provider for failure to establish a proper system of
management, prompt handling of potential patients, and proper
staffing levels. In the past the focus has been upon the individ-
ual practitioner, or on the provider as an employer who is po-
tentially vicariously liable." A second contentious area is that
of the possible liability of a "Good Samaritan." Currently, a
health care provider is under no obligation to aid an individual
who is not a patient. A third, even more controversial area, is
the possible liability of the state to potential patients for failure
to organise the health care system. The only bright spot, from
the plaintiff's point of view, is that there is no suggestion of an
attack on the basic doctor-patient duty situation.
B. Experts
1. The general test
There is a common approach to the standard of care required
from any expert. English law does not make special provisions
for doctors. They are simply treated as one among many profes-
sions. In the very recent cases of R v. Prentice & Sullman,
Adomako and Holloway'2 the court dealt simultaneously with
two cases of alleged medical manslaughter by gross negligence
and a case involving an electrician, and applied exactly the same
reasoning to all of them.
The standard of care for a doctor in a civil malpractice suite
was explained by McNair, J.:
The only question is really a question of professional skill....
In the ordinary case which does not involve any special skill,
negligence in law means a failure to do some act which a rea-
sonable man in the circumstances would do, or the doing of
some act which a reasonable man in the circumstances would
not do; and if that failure or the doing of that act results in
injury, then there is a cause of action.... But where you get a
situation which involves the use of some special skill or com-
11. It is for this reason that in many of the cases it is the name of the authority
which appears as the defendant. In earlier times there was reluctance to accept re-
sponsibility for professional staff. Cf. R.G. Lee, Vicarious Liability for Medical Negli-
gence-A History, 4 ANGLO AM. L. REV. 313 (1978). See also John H. Tingle, The
Allocation of Healthcare Resources in the National Health Service in England, 2 AN-
NALS HEALTH L. 195 (1993).
12. [1993] 3 W.L.R. 927 (C.A.).
[Vol. 3228
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petence, then the test... is the standard of the ordinary skilled
man exercising and professing to have that special skill. A
man need not possess the highest expert skill; it is well estab-
lished law that it is sufficient if he exercises the ordinary skill
of an ordinary competent man exercising that particular art.
[N]egligence means failure to act in accordance with the stan-
dards of reasonably competent medical men at the time.... In
a recent Scottish case, Hunter v. Hanley, Lord President Clyde
said: "In the realm of diagnosis and treatment there is ample
scope for genuine difference of opinion and one man clearly is
not negligent merely because his conclusion differs from that
of other professional men, nor because he has displayed less
skill or knowledge than others would have shown. The true
test for establishing negligence in diagnosis or treatment on
the part of a doctor is whether he has been proved to be guilty
of such failure as no doctor of ordinary skill would be guilty of,
if acting with ordinary care." ... I myself would prefer to put
it this way, that he is not guilty of negligence if he has acted in
accordance with a practice accepted as proper by a responsible
body of medical men skilled in that particular art.13
This was, of course, not the first such case, but it is the one
which has become accepted as the best expression of the princi-
ple at issue. The passage from Lord President Clyde's judge-
ment cited by McNair, J., is also regularly relied on where the
case turns on a conflict of medical opinion.
2. Areas of application
There has been considerable resistance to the application of
the Bolam test in other contexts. In the case itself there were
allegations of inadequate information to the patient as to the
risks and benefits of the treatment, and of the selection of an
unacceptable method of treatment. The first allegation seems to
have been rather half hearted, and .the case was initially treated
as essentially an authority in relation to the choice of treatment
methods. It has, however, been firmly endorsed in all medical
contexts.
For example, Whitehouse v. Jordan14 is a case where it was
alleged that the actual management of an attempt to use forceps
in a difficult labour was negligently conducted. The House of
13. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 (Appeal
taken from C.A.).
14. [19811 1 W.L.R. 246 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
19941
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Lords enthusiastically applied the Bolam test to this different
context. Whitehouse is clearly a case of an error of judgement
while treating. In the Court of Appeal, Lord Fraser of Tul-
lybelton said that an error of judgement "that would not have
been made by a reasonably competent professional man pro-
fessing to have the standard and type of skill that the defendant
held himself out as having, and acting with ordinary care.... it is
negligent.' 15
Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority16 was a
case where two doctors decided not to accept a provisional, ob-
vious diagnosis of tuberculosis because certain unusual features
led them to suspect the possibility of Hodgkin's disease. The
patient suffered harm as a result of a side effect of a diagnostic
operation. She proved not to have Hodgkin's disease, but there
was no suggestion that the actual damage was anything other
than an accidental side effect of a competently performed proce-
dure. The House of Lords held that the Bolam test, and Lord
Clyde's dictum in Hanley v. Hunter,17 applied to cases where the
complaint was as to the diagnosis. Lord Scarman disagreed with
the decision of the trial judge that there was negligence, because
he preferred the evidence of the plaintiff's expert witness as to
the proper diagnostic approach. "[I]n the realm of diagnosis
and treatment negligence is not established by preferring one
respectable body of professional opinion to another. Failure to
exercise the ordinary skill of a doctor (in the appropriate speci-
ality, if he be a specialist) is necessary. "18
This same test was, predictably, further extended to nonthera-
peutic procedures (contraception) in Gold v. Haringey Health
Authority.'9 The plaintiff complained that she had not been
warned of the risk of failure of the operation, or of the lower
failure rate of vasectomy. Lloyd, L.J. reiterated that the Bolam
test applies to all professionals and experts, and is not to be lim-
ited by a context.2 °
15. Id. at 263.
16. [1984] 1 W.L.R. 634 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
17. 1955 S.L.T. 213, 217 (1st Div.) (Scot.).
18. Maynard, [1984] 1 W.L.R. at 639.
19. [1988] 1 Q.B. 481 (C.A.).
20. Thake v. Maurice, [1986] 1 Q.B. 669 (C.A.), is one of the few cases where
liability has been established for anything other than carelessness. It is a contracep-
tive case, but it is a deceptive authority because it was only decided as it was because
the defendant's lawyers failed to ensure that his expert evidence could be given.
230 [Vol. 3
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English law has yet to establish clearly how the junior doctor
is to be viewed. It is clear that the general practitioner is not
expected to reach the standard of the specialist, although he
may only discharge his own duty by referring the patient to the
appropriate specialist. In general, the inexperienced operator
receives no special consideration; thus, a learner driver under
instruction must come up to the general standard of the compe-
tent driver.21 The leading case in the area is Wilsher v. Essex
Area Health Authority22 where the plaintiff was a very prema-
ture baby kept alive with great difficulty in a special unit, but
who was found to have developed retrolental fibroplasia. There
was an incident of excess oxygen being given because a junior
doctor had mistakenly inserted a monitoring catheter into a vein
rather than an artery, and a senior doctor had failed to observe
this when asked to double-check by his junior.
The standard required of the junior doctor is said to be "not
just that of the averagely competent and well-informed junior
houseman ... but of such a person who fills a post in a unit
offering a highly specialised service;" 23 "the law requires the
trainee or learner to be judged by the same standard as his more
experienced colleagues. If it did not, inexperience would fre-
quently be urged as a defence to an action for professional negli-
gence. ' '24 An attempt by Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson VC to
tie the standard required to the experience and competence of
the individual concerned was rejected as introducing an inap-
propriate subjective element. On the other hand, the concept of
team negligence, or a single standard for all in an intensive care
unit, was also rejected as failing to distinguish the level of skill
and competence to be expected from a nurse from that of a
consultant.
English law has not yet truly come to terms with the present
world where, rather than a single all-powerful consultant, there
is a team of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals
providing a skill mix.
3. Problem areas
The most controversial areas deal with the application of the
test announced in Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management to ad-
21. Nettleship v. Weston, [1971] 2 Q.B. 691 (C.A.).
22. [1987] 1 Q.B. 730 (C.A.), rev'd on other grounds, [1988] 1 App. Cas. 1074.
23. Id. at 751 (Mustill, L.J.).
24. Id. at 774 (Glidewell, L.J.).
1994]
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vice given as to the risks and benefits of proposed treatment.
First, courts detemined that lack of informed consent cases are
based upon negligence principles. The case of Chatterton v.
Gerson2 5 concerned the application of intrathecal phenol as a
pain-relieving measure of last resort. At the time the phenol
was given, it was still experimental in the U.K. and there was
little evidence of the general practice. The plaintiff framed a
claim in battery on the footing that she had not given true or
informed consent to the treatment in the absence of proper ex-
planation of the possible complications. This argument was re-
jected. Bristow, J., ruled:
[WIhat the court has to do in each case is to look at all the
circumstances and say: "Was there a real consent?" I think
justice requires that in order to vitiate the reality of consent
there be a greater failure of communication between doctor
and patient than that involved in a breach of duty if the claim
is based on negligence. When the claim is based on negligence
the plaintiff must prove not only the breach of duty to inform,
but that had the duty not been broken she would not have
chosen to have the operation. When the claim is based on
trespass to the person, then what the plaintiff would have de-
cided if she had been given the information ... is irrelevant.
[O]nce the plaintiff is informed in broad terms of the nature of
the procedure which is intended, and gives her consent, that
consent is real, and the cause of action on which to base a
claim for failure to go into risks and implications is negligence,
not trespass.26
This case was followed in Hills v. Potter27 where the trial
judge, Hirst, J., considered the American case of Canterbury v.
Spence28 and the Canadian cases of Hopp v. Lepp29 and Reibl v.
Hughes,30 which he used in support of the proposition that negli-
gence rather than trespass was the appropriate action.
Although both English cases were at first instance only, they
have been accepted as representing the law.
Second, courts apply the Bolam test to determine what infor-
mation should be given. The case of Sidaway v. Bethlem Royal
25. [1981] 1 All E.R. 257 (Q.B.).
26. Id. at 265.
27. [1983] 3 All E.R. 716 (Q.B.).
28. 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
29. 112 D.L.R.3d 67 (Can. 1980).
30. 114 D.L.R.3d 1 (Can. 1980).
[Vol. 3
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& Hospital Governors31 concerned an alleged failure to warn of
the risks associated with a particular operation.32 While the
House was divided as to the proper test to be applied, 33 the ma-
jority considered that the Bolam test was of universal applica-
tion. Lord Diplock said:
In English jurisprudence the doctor's relationship with his pa-
tient which gives rise to the normal duty of care to exercise his
skill and judgement to improve the patient's health in any par-
ticular respect in which the patient has sought his aid has hith-
erto been treated as a single comprehensive duty covering all
the ways in which a doctor is called upon to exercise his skill or
judgement in the improvement of the physical or mental con-
dition of the patient.34
His Lordship pointed out that Bolam itself concerned inter
alia an allegation of failure to warn, which had been dealt with
in the same terms as the allegation of inappropriate treatment.
There is a recognition that the application of the Bolam test
may be an abdication of responsibility by the law, thus allowing
expert medical evidence to determine the outcome. Two of
their Lordships asserted that medical evidence was not
conclusive:
[E]ven in a case where ... no expert witness in the relevant
medical field condemns the non-disclosure as being in conflict
with accepted and responsible medical practice, I am of opin-
ion that the judge might in certain circumstances come to the
conclusion that disclosure of a particular risk was so necessary
to an informed choice on the part of the patient that no rea-
sonably prudent medical man would fail to make it.35
Hirst, J., said much the same in Hills v. Potter:
I do not accept.., that, by adopting the Bolam principle, the
court in effect abdicates its power of decision to the doctors.
In every case the court must be satisfied that the standard con-
tended for on [the defendant's] behalf accords with that up-
held by a substantial body of medical opinion, and that this
body of medical opinion is both respectable and responsible,
and experienced in this particular field of medicine.3 6
31. [1985] 1 All E.R. 643 (Appeal from C.A.).
32. The risk that eventuated was significantly less than a one percent chance.
33. The minority view was that one or other version of informed consent should
apply.
34. Sidaway, [1985] 1 All E.R. at 657.
35. Id. at 663 (Bridge, L.J., with whom Lord Keith expressly agreed).
36. [1983] 3 All E.R. at 728.
19941 233
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Concern has been expressed that, although this approach pays
lip service to the concept of patient autonomy, it does little to
advance it. This has led to friction between the nursing profes-
sion, which has an explicit commitment to patient advocacy, and
the medical profession, elements of which retain a fairly pater-
nalistic approach. This is exemplified by persistent complaints
from patients that they have been admitted for limited proce-
dures, for example, a biopsy, and that doctors have relied on the
fairly general terms of a written consent covering not only the
intended treatment, the effect of which has been explained to
the patient, but also further procedures that may be deemed to
be necessary as a result of the institution of treatment. In most
cases the patients have been female (radical mastectomies and
hysterectomies), so there have been issues of gender as well as
patient autonomy to be considered. Although there have been
persistent anecdotes, and indeed general newspaper articles on
the subject, there is little formal evidence or medico-legal dis-
cussion. One current cause cdlebre concerns a patient undergo-
ing a hysterectomy for endometriosis. During the course of the
operation pregnancy was suspected, although the position was
complicated by the presence of fibroids. There is a suggestion in
published accounts that the surgeon realised this and carried on
regardless. This is borne out by his alleged comment to the pa-
tient: "You would not have wanted the baby anyway," and by
suggestions that if the husband had been contactable the proce-
dure would have been halted. Private communications suggest,
however, that the pregnancy was not confirmed at any time
when the procedure could have been safely halted. The patient
has threatened criminal proceedings under the abortion
legislation.37
It has also been suggested that the test generally favours de-
fensive and conservative treatment, since novel treatments will
not be generally endorsed. This ignores the very detailed safe-
guards in the shape of clinical trials and peer review that lie be-
hind the introduction of new procedures and medicaments, and
also the general bias of medicine towards new solutions. There
is, however, some evidence of the practice of defensive
medicine,38 and considerable anecdotal evidence of the fear of
litigation.
37. The matter is therefore sub judice.
38. See, e.g., M. Ennis et al., Change in Obstetric Practice in Response to Fear of
Litigation in the British Isles, 338 THE LANCET 616 (1991).
234 [Vol. 3
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Another problem area arises when the witholding of medical
treatment is suggested. Since English law does not recognise a
doctrine of informed consent-that is, consent must be real-
once there is justification, the obligation is to fulfill the medical
duty of care. However, several propositions are all supported
either explicitly or implicitly by all of their Lordships in the
Bland case, 39 in which the doctors of a young man who re-
mained in a persistent vegitative state wished to discontinue ar-
tificial feeding; this decision was supported by the family. First,
a doctor must act in the best interests of the patient. Second, a
doctor must act in accordance with a recognised body of medical
opinion.40 Third, in the case of a competent patient, self-deter-
mination is paramount and that patient may validly refuse con-
sent to treatment.41  Fourth, consent may be treated as
continuing, although the patient later becomes incompetent.
(While English law does not formally recognise advance direc-
tives or "living wills," they are normally acceded to.) Finally,
the institution or continuance of treatment of an incompetent
patient must be in the interests of that patient.42 Where it is not,
invasive treatment will be unjustified and unlawful.
Thus, once a doctor-patient relationship comes into existence,
the duty of care is a duty to provide such treatment as is appro-
priate, within the limits of the patient's consent, if the patient is
sui juris and in a fit state to give consent. If an adult patient has
clearly stated that he or she does not wish to be subjected to
certain forms of resuscitation, or indeed to any other form of
treatment, the doctor must respect those wishes.43
When faced with the issue, the court will lean to preserving
life unless the evidence suggests that the future will be demon-
strably so intolerable that life will not be worth living.4" How-
ever, it has been recongised that there may be cases where "life"
may be sustained indefinitely by artifical means without evident
suffering, but with a negligible quality of life. Sir Stephen
39. Airedale NHS Trust v. Bland, [1993] App. Cas. 789 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
40. Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582 (Appeal
taken from C.A.).
41. R. v. Blaue, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446 (C.A.). Compare Nancy B. v. H~tel Dieu de
Quebec, 86 D.L.R.4th 385 (Que. Super. Ct. 1992) (Can.) with In Re S (Adult, refusal
of medical treatment), 1993 Fain. 123.
42. In re B. (A Minor) (Wardship: Medical Treatment), [1981] W.L.R. 1421
(C.A.).
43. R. v. Blaue, [1975] 3 All E.R. 446 (no suggestion of criticism of the doctor who
respected a Jehovah's Witness' refusal to a blood transfusion).
44. In re J (Wardship: Medical Treatment) 1991 Fam. 33 (C.A.).
1994] 235
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Brown,45 the Court of Appeal, and the House of Lords ruled in
Bland that it is not unlawful to withhold treatment in such cases,
and that artificial nutrition is treatment for this purpose.4 6 How-
ever, it is clear that Bland applies only to the circumstances of
that case.47
Contrary to the American view, the Law Lords recently indi-
cated that while the family should be consulted and involved,
they should not be the final arbiters.48 It is the court's obligation
to reveiw the doctor's decision of what the ward would have
chosen if he was in a position to make a sound judgment.49 It
may be simply that the concept of the advance directive is still
so alien that the English judges do not know how to apply it to
the wishes of the typical victim. It is also reasonable and under-
standable that English courts have reacted as they have given
the great scope of the doctor's professional judgement in Eng-
land compared with the involvement of the patient in decision
making in America.
Finally, the negligence system does not address one important
issue at all. Many victims, whether of medical misadventures or
other disasters, are not interested, or not primarily interested, in
compensation. Michael Napier has listed the actual concerns for
major disasters, but this list can be applied mutatis mutandis to
medical cases: 1) a detailed investigation of the facts to estab-
lish how the disaster occurred; 2) how each deceased met his or
her death; 3) how the disaster could have been avoided; 4) the
assessment and apportionment of blame, and 5) the penalising
of the culpable. 50 A civil action may barely touch on these, as
with a case I dealt with in practice where a girl was killed by the
gross negligence of her dentist, who administered a general an-
aesthetic in his surgery without professional assistance when he
knew her to be an uncontrolled diabetic. The response to a writ
45. President of the Family Division of the High Court.
46. Concern has rightly been expressed by a range of commentators that if one
allows an argument about quality of life, one has crossed an essential moral dividing
line, and is on the proverbial slippery slope to euthanasia of the unfit because of
economics or convenience. A detailed discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of
this overview article.
47. Frenchay Healthcare NHS Trust v. S, THE TIMES, Jan. 19, 1994.
48. Id.
49. Emphasized was the need for applications to "be preceded by full investiga-
tion with an opportunity for the Official Solicitor, representing the unconscious pa-
tient, to explore the situation fully, to obtain independent medical opinions of his
own, and to ensure that all proper material was before the court ... ." Id.
50. Michael Napier, Group Litigation, Past, Present, and Future, 1993 NOTriNG-
HAM L.J. 1.
236 [Vol. 3
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was an instant payment into court of an amount significantly
larger than the likely award of damages. There could then be no
further investigation of the cause of the tragedy at the instance
of the parents. There are statutory complaint and disciplinary
procedures, but these are also perceived as ineffective. 1
II. CAUSATION
It is trite law that there will be liability only where the defend-
ant has caused the plaintiff's harm. So when, in Barnett v. Ken-
sington & Chelsea Hospital Management Committee, 2 a house
surgeon negligently failed to diagnose acute arsenical poisoning,
there was liability only for a small element of pain and suffering
occasioned by the absence of palliative measures, since the evi-
dence was that death was inevitable. This was taken one stage
further in Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Authority.53 In
this case the plaintiff, a thirteen year-old boy, injured himself by
falling out of a tree and fracturing the femoral epiphysis. This
injury was initially misdiagnosed, and by the time it was prop-
erly diagnosed he had sustained an irreversible avascular necro-
sis. The medical evidence was contradictory. One expert said
the necrosis was inevitable, given the initial injury; the other
said that it was likely but not probable, and prompt treatment
might have made the difference. The judges concluded that
there was a seventy-five percent chance that the necrosis was
caused by the initial fall. On that basis the plaintiff unsuccess-
fully argued that he had lost a twenty-five percent chance of a
recovery and should receive twenty-five percent of his dam-
ages.5 4 The court disagreed. Previous cases held that concur-
rent and consecutive causes, if essentially the same except not in
competition with each other,5 were legally causative if they
could not be eliminated as immaterial.56 However, a different
51. It is only very recently that incompetence and malpractice have been accepted
as being medical misconduct. There is a sharp conflict with the nurses' regulatory
body, the United Kingdom Central Council for Nursing, Midwifery, and Health Visit-
ing. This body has always treated negligence as misconduct.
52. [1968] 1 All E.R. 1068 (Q.B.).
53. [1987] 1 App. Cas. 750 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
54. Such claims had been allowed in other contexts in contract. See, e.g., Chaplin
v. Hicks, [1911] 2 K.B. 786 (C.A.). This is therefore one area where a private patient
may be better placed than an NHS one.
55. Causes are in competition if they are mutually exclusive, or have no
interrelationship.
56. McGhee v. Nat'l Coal Bd., [1973] 1 W.L.R. 1 (Appeal taken from Ct. of Ses-
sion); Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw, [1956] App. Cas. 613 (Appeal taken from Ct.
1994]
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rule applied where there were two competing consecutive
causes. The plaintiff had to be considered as he was at the mo-
ment of the negligence.
On the evidence there was a clear conflict as to what had
caused the avascular necrosis. The authority's evidence was
that the sole cause was the original traumatic injury to the hip.
The plaintiff's evidence, at its highest, was that the delay in
treatment was a material contributory cause. This was a con-
flict, like any other about some relevant past event, which the
judge could not avoid resolving on a balance of probabilities.
Unless the plaintiff proved on a balance of probabilities that
the delayed treatment was at least a material contributory
cause of the avascular necrosis he failed on the issue of causa-
tion.... But the judge's findings of fact ... are unmistakably
to the effect that on a balance of probabilities the injury
caused by the plaintiff's fall left insufficient blood vessels in-
tact to keep the epiphysis alive. This amounts to a finding of
fact that the fall was the sole cause of the avascular necrosis. 57
The Wilsher case was appealed to the House of Lords on the
issue of causation. 8 At this stage it was accepted that there was
negligence in allowing raised oxygen levels on one (of several)
occasions. The question was whether the plaintiff could prove,
or the court presume, that this negligence caused the harm, ret-
rolental fibroplasia (RLF). The House decided that the issue of
causation had not been correctly addressed at first instance and
that as a result the relevant findings of fact had not been made.5 9
They therefore remitted the case for a retrial. However, the
House did indicate that there were a number of co-acting
causes, some negligent, some not. Lord Bridge drew a distinc-
tion between cases where the various causes could be said to be
cumulative ("both/and"), applying Bonnington ° and McGhee,6'
of Session). In each case the plaintiff was exposed to dust, and in each case part of the
exposure was tortious. In Bonnington Castings the two exposures were simultaneous,
while in McGhee they were consecutive, but in each case the vector of harm was the
same, whether legitimate or illegitimate.
57. Hotson, [1987] 1 App. Cas. at 782 (Bridge, L.J.).
58. [1988] 1 App. Cas. 1074 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
59. The issue was whether, as the plaintiff alleged, the sole cause was elevated
oxygen levels, or whether the RLF was linked to other ailments of the seriously pre-
mature (e.g., apnea, hypercarbia, intraventricular hemorrhage, patent ductus arteri-
osus). The writer's understanding was that there is a clear link with excess oxygen.
His own case in the area came to grief because the child was born after the benefits of
extra oxygen were known, but before the risks, including RLF, had manifested them-
selves. The test of negligence is current knowledge. Roe v. Minister of Health, [1954]
2 Q.B. 66 (C.A.).
60. [1956] App. Cas. 613 (currently acting causes).
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and cases like the present where there were a number of com-
peting causes ("either/or"). He adopted what Sir Nicolas
Browne-Wilkinson VC said in the Court of Appeal that the evi-
dence showed there were half a dozen competing causes of the
RLF. The negligently administered excess oxygen was one
among them, but there was no evidence before the court to
show that the excess oxygen rather than the other competing
causes did result in the RLF. This did not raise any inference or
presumption that the negligent cause was an operative cause,
still less any suggestion of res ipsa loquitur. It was therefore for
the plaintiff to establish on balance in the usual way that it was
the negligent act that caused or materially contributed to the
harm. The burden remained with the plaintiff, and the findings
of fact were inadequate to indicate that it had been discharged.
This is consistent with the earlier case of Kay v. Ayrshire &
Arran Health Board.62 In this case the plaintiff had suffered an
attack of pneumococcal meningitis. During the course of treat-
ment he received a massive overdose of penicillin. He recov-
ered, but was left severely deaf. The evidence established
deafness as a common side effect of this form of meningitis, but
there was no firm evidence linking penicillin overdose to deaf-
ness. In those circumstances it was held that there was no suffi-
cient evidence of causation in relation to the deafness.
III. No-FAULT LIABILITY
It is hardly surprising that there have been suggestions that
the law outlined above is unfair to plaintiffs. It requires proof of
quite serious departures from accepted standards, which the
courts are reluctant to find. The issues of causation are com-
plex. Defendants also feel that the stigmatisation of conduct as
negligent is a reflection on their competence when it may really
reflect pressure of work, inexperience, or bad luck. There are
also concerns that the adversarial system does not lead to
proper investigation of mishaps to avoid repetition or even an
early expression of regret to the victims. Thus for some years
there have been proposals for no-fault recovery for medical mis-
haps. The Pearson Report considered no-fault schemes gener-
ally, with specific reference to road and industrial accidents.
Representations were made to the Royal Commission about its
application to medical negligence, but they were unpersuaded:
61. [1972] 3 All E.R. 1008 (consecutive causes of the same kind).
62. [1987] 2 All E.R. 417 (Appeal taken from Ct. of Session).
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We considered the possibility of abolishing tort for two other
categories of injury, medical and ante-natal. In relation to
medical injuries it was put to us that it was particularly difficult
to prove negligence and, still more important, that it was often
impossible to ascertain whether or not the injury was indeed a
"medical injury." It might not be clear whether a given deteri-
oration in the patient's condition would or would not have oc-
curred but for the act or omission complained of. It was also
put to us that there were widespread fears that the risk of liti-
gation was proving an obstacle to good and economical medi-
cal practice, and that, if litigation became more common,
insurance premiums might rise to prohibitive levels. But we
did not find these arguments strong enough to justify making
medical injuries a special case where tort liability would not
apply ....63
The British Medical Association has periodically revived the
call for no-fault liability. However little has been done. The
causation issues are probably central to the nonimplementation
of these proposals. In Sweden, the no-fault liability system tops
up very generous social security payments. In the U.K. such
payments, made on the basis of need rather than causation, are
far from generous. A no-fault top-up to tort damages levels
would therefore be very costly.
IV. DAMAGES
The English approach to damages is different than the North
American one. One key distinction is that juries are not in-
volved. The judge acts as the finder of fact both in relation to
liability and quantum.64 This means that there is a body of es-
tablished case law that indicates the parameters for awards.
This is respected by the judges, and is therefore a sound basis for
negotiation by the representatives of the parties. There is little
chance of an excessive award out of sympathy for a deserving
plaintiff (or an undeserving defendant). As a result quantum is
very commonly agreed upon, even when liability is in dispute. It
is felt in England that our awards are modest, even mean, but
63. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CIVIL LIABILITY AND COMPENSA-
TION FOR PERSONAL INJURY, Cmnd. 7054 (1978).
64. This rule is absolute. A request for jury trial was recently rejected where the
injury was a traumatic amputation of the penis. The unsuccessful argument was that
only a jury could reach a collective decision on quantum in such a case.
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this is by comparison with the exceptional foreign awards that
are published.
The major element of damage awards is special damages,
designed to compensate for the loss of earnings and additional
expenditure on nursing, adaptation of the home, etc. The basis
of calculation is the same in all cases, whether medical or not.
While the plaintiff is entitled to the cost of private medical treat-
ment to palliate or rectify matters, the overall award for medical
costs will be lower than in the United States by virtue of the
availability of free NHS treatment and accommodation. 66
Net loss of earnings to trial are payable in full, subject to the
recoupment of any social security benefits paid.67 Future earn-
ings, both in the previous job and in relation to a putative ca-
reer, are awarded on the basis of a multiplier. This is supposed
to reflect the plaintiff's expectation of life and other vicissitudes
and also the effect of payment of a lump sum which can earn
interest. The calculation is not scientific, and takes no account
of actual interest rates or actuarial information.68 However, the
plaintiff is allowed to retain in full the benefit of his own insur-
ance and any voluntary charitable or similar payments.69
Until recently all awards were of a lump sum nature, although
there was provision for interim payments on account.70 Re-
cently provision has been made for the award of provisional
damages in appropriate cases. 71 Under this provision, an award
is made on the basis of the plaintiff's existing condition. A note
is made of any particular complication that may cause deteriora-
tion, and a further application may be made if this occurs. This
avoids the problem that with a lump sum compensation is never
exact. Payment is made for such conditions proportional to the
risk. If the risk occurs, there is undercompensation. If it does
not, there is over-compensation.
65. These are often jury awards from the United States. The final figure agreed or
settled at appeal is not usually reported.
66. Savings resulting from the latter are set against loss of earnings. Administra-
tion of Justice Act, 1982, c.53, § 5 (Eng.).
67. Social Security Act, 1989, c.24, § 22 (Eng.). The Act does not apply to small
claims under £2,500. It applies to benefits over the five-year period from the
"accident."
68. Mitchell v. Mulholland (No. 2), [1972] 1 Q.B. 65 (C.A.); Spiers v. Halliday,
THE TIMES, June 30, 1984.
69. McCamley v. Cammell Laird Shipbuilders Ltd., [1990] 1 W.L.R. 963 (C.A.);
Parry v. Cleaver, [1970] App. Cas. 1 (Appeal taken from C.A.).
70. Rules of the Supreme Court 029 (Eng.).
71. Supreme Court Act, 1981, c.54, § 32A (Eng.) (as amended in 1982, in force
July 1, 1985).
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Structured settlements have been imported from the United
States for use in the most serious cases. They are at present
achieved unofficially, that is, without a proper legal framework.
Technically they rest on an award that is invested in annuities to
produce a capital sum or sums.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately the heavy reliance on medical evidence has pro-
tected the doctors. Almost alone among professionals they are
allowed, in practice, to determine their own standards. This may
foster complacency, but it also reduces exposure to claims. De-
spite the fear of a flood of claims, the present law serves the
doctors more than well, but at the expense of leaving some vic-
tims of "medical accidents" uncompensated.
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